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Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
E. H. HUBER and 
RALPH DUNKLEY, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
VICTOR NEWMAN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Motion 
No. 69166. 
Appellant respectfully moves the court for leave to file 
the accompanying reply to Respondents' answering brief 
served Dec. 25th, 1943, in this appeal. 
0. H. MATTHEWS, 
P. G. ELLIS, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
E. H. HUBER and 
RALPH DUNKLEY, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
VICTOR NEWMAN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 69166. 
Memo. Reply Brief 
We shall be as sparing as possible but feel that we 
should notice a few points in respondents' brief, belatedly 
filed. We allocate our remarks to the page numbers of that 
brief. 
Page 3. They cite Gibbs v. District Court, 44 Pac. 2d 
· 504, in opposition to our citation of Rozelle v. District Court, 
39 Pac. 2d 1113, (both Utah cases). We reply that the Gibbs 
case does not purport to overrule or modify the Rozelle ease, 
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but distinguishes the Rozelle case on its facts and applies 
the law to the variant facts of the Gibbs case. 
Respond,ents assume that there is such an analogy be-
twee~ the facts of the two cases that the latter decision in 
' . . 
effect overrules or modifies the former. Such is not the 
case. It is the privilege and function of this court to decide 
that question, and whether a later decision modifies or dis-
places a former one. It decided that question in the negative 
in the Gibbs case, and distinguished that case on its facts 
from the Rozelle case. It held that the Rozelle case is not, 
on its facts, contrary to or inconsistent with the Gibbs case, 
even though it so appears on first glance. Thereby it quieted 
any doubts on the subject and marked out the field oi .law 
dpminated by each case. In the Gibbs case the analogy here 
claimed by respondent was urged but rejected by this court, 
and that settles it. 
One chief difference in the Gibbs case is that the com-
plainant sought relief by the writ of prohibition, which is 
a high prerogative writ issuable only in the discretion of 
this court, used sparingly, and only where grave mischief 
may result, irreparably, in case of delay. It is never granted 
as of right, or of course. And it construed the facts of that 
case not to he of that nature, nor to raise a serious juris .. 
dictional question. It ruled that under the specific facts of 
that case, as set out in the opinion, the trial court had a 
measure of discretion whether it would try the main ques-
tions first and the accounting later, or whether it would 
combine the whole in one hearing. Having that discretion 
the Supreme Court refused to interfere with its exercise. 
In the Rozelle case it had held that an attempt by the t:fial 
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court to go into an accounting between the parties on , tb~ 
theory that they were partners without any evidence that 
there was a partnership, was an act in excess of jurisdiction. 
And the question was presented in that case by appeal, which 
searches a record and reviews all errors whether procedural 
or jurisdictional. The writ of review was granted in that case 
merely to stay the hand of the trial court until the jurisdic-
tional question could be determined on the concurrent appeal. 
Quite a decisive difference from the remedy sought andre-
fused in the Gibbs case. 
The case at bar is exactly like the Rozelle case and hence 
is ruled by that case. That is, the complaint, issues and 
remedy sought are the same. And the review is by appeal 
in both cases, not by prohibition as in the Gibbs case. Part-
nership alleged but not proved the same as in the Rozelle 
case, but in this case plaintiff Dunkley himself expressly 
testified to the contrary (our opening p. 26), that there was 
no general partnership agreement covering all these trans-
actions. 
In the Gibbs case this court held that on the facts of that 
case the trial court had discretion, with which it would not 
interfere by prohibition. In this case we have neither in-
voked prohibition, nor sought to interfere with discretion, 
nor asked this court to do so. Our remedy is by appeal which 
searches the record for all errors whether procedural or 
jurisdictional. The trial court took its own course (as we 
contend, the correct course), in its decision to try the ques-
tion of partnership first; and if it should find partnership 
then it would order an accounting. (Our opening brief p. 
11-13.) In so doing, it ruled out all testimony and questions 
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~~·; e'lther side that would become proper if and wh(m -an 
·ac~ounting might be taken up. And it stated that if it should 
find ·against partnership it would dismiss the complaint and 
th~re would be no accounting (our openingp.l2). Both sides 
yielded to this ruling and put in only evidence respecting the 
partnership issue. Hence there is no possible occasion for 
invoking the Gibbs case ruling that the order of procedure 
{on the facts of that case) is discretionary and will not be 
controlled by the writ of prohibition. It was not so interfered 
with in this case. 
'At the conclusion of the second day's trial, when both 
sides 'had rested, the· court announced from the bench its 
conclusion that each of these jobs were joint ventures, 
directed preparations of findings and decree accordingly, 
a~pointed a referee, and told the parties to appear before 
the· referee with their books and witnesses (our opening 
brief p. 52). The trial court's views as to procedure were 
put into practice without objection from either side. Hence, 
n'either the Gibbs case, nor either of the others associated 
therewith in citation in counsel's brief, have any bearing on 
the case here. Even if apropos, this Court has settled the 
law 'in: this jurisdiction . 
. The difficulty in this case is that the trial court after 
.e:xercising its. discr.etion (whether discretionary or juriS,d~c­
tional it -does not matter) to try this case in two parts, to 
· wit: .. partnership first, accounting second, and after haying 
·tried the .first part separately, never did proceed to a trial 
of:the second part, i.e.~ accounting. It never tooktestimpny 
:of:witnesses in open court on that subject, and.:neither.;Q.id 
the referee ever do so .. But the latter cooked .UP an, accpJ,l;nt-
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iBg of his own from unsworn sources, and so we have never 
bad any trial at all. But the trial court rendered jud~ent 
against defendant for $19,451.03 without any evidence a~ 
all that defendant owed plaintiffs anything. 
Their page 6. They say finding 1 agrees with. their 
pleading parag. 1 and 2. We say it comprehends much more 
and so does their judgment. They pleaded only the railroad 
job, hospital job and Harrison-Dorman job, but their finding 
embraces also the Stearns-Rogers job, the Geer job, and the 
Fort Douglas, all balled up together in one lump sum recov-
ery. Findings and judgment which transcend the pleadings 
and issues are void. (Cases cited in our opening brief p. 58.). 
They say their allegation and finding number 3 agree. 
That is immaterial. The real question is whether they per-
formed their contract, if they had one, not whether they 
performed their understandings. Nobody can tell what they 
understood. 
Their page 7. They say that their pleading and finding 
No. 4 agree that there was no definite term agreed on for 
their supposed partnership agreement. Whether this is so 
or not, we say that this contention (coupled with plaintiff 
Dunkley's undisputed testimony in open court that there 
never was any general agreement or contract of partnership 
covering all jobs, but each job was a separate undertaking 
independent of all others-our opening p. 26), prevents re-
covery by plaintiffs of any amount whatever. Because of 
the three jobs mentioned in the complaint, two of them lost 
money, so there were no profits to divide, regardless of 
whether there was a partnership or not, and the remaining 
hospital job was never undertaken on joint or common ac-
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cotiht. But defendant gave them notice on the very day that 
job was taken, that they were not to share profits on it, but 
they could remain and work at $100 a week if desired, eltte 
quit. They elected to stay on wages for a short time, th~n 
quit, while defendant completed the job himself from begin-
ning to end, on his own resources. This testimony was not 
disputed by plaintiffs by any evidence at the trial. So that 
defendant was under no obligation to take them in on the 
profits. 
Their pages 8-12. In their discussion here respondents 
overlook the issues as to negligence, failure to keep complete 
and separate accounts on the jobs, misappropriation of funds, 
and botching everything, so they had to be fired at length. 
Even were they partners they would be answerable for all 
this, no matter whether appellant was damaged and injured 
as a partner or as an employer. Plaintiffs were asking for 
the accounting, and would themselves have to account aml 
do equity in order to obtain equity. Findings were necessary 
on these issues, after a trial upon sworn testimony of wit-
nesses. 
Their·pages 12-13. They try to dodge the issue here by 
saying that their complaint alleged partnership while the 
court found joint adventures. If this was a vital distinctiQn 
they would be out of court, because they alleged one thing 
and proved the other. We have not seen fit to raise that 
question in our first brief, and do not see fit to do so now. 
In other respects they straddle the issue on their p.13. What 
we .argued under assignment 3 was that the trial jud~e 
misconstrued the evidence that plaintiffs were to share 
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profits on certain jobs as compensation for their labor and 
services, by treating it as conclusive evidence of partnership. 
Their page 14. The colloquy set out on page 14 of coun~ 
sel's brief is misleading. No such stipulation was made by 
Mr. Morrissey on behalf of defendant Newman. And if he 
had have, it would not be binding on his client in view of 
the latter's explicit testimony to the contrary, and also that 
of Mr. Dunkley in sundry particulars we collected in our 
opening brief. But Mr. Morrissey did not so intend. To 
understand this we must give a brief resume of the previous 
proceedings. The trial court had, at the conclusion of the 
first two days trial in April, 1943, announced its conclusion 
that: 
"It seems to me that these were joint ventures 
on these jobs mentioned in the complaint, i.e., the 
railroad job, the hospital job and the Harrison-Dar-
man job ;-the hospital job up to Sept. 3rd. 
(Further discussion) 
"On Sept. 3rd, the joint venture on all these oper~ 
ations ceased at that time." (See our opening brief 
pp. 50-51.) 
The Court was in error both as to fact and dates. There 
was never any joint venture (or sharing of profits) agreed 
to or undertaken on the hospital job, but notice was given 
to plaintiffs on the very day the contract on that job was 
taken, that there was to be no profit-sharing on that job, 
but they could work on weekly wages or quit. They elected 
to continue at work on that job pursuant to that notice and 
one of them at least actually drew wages at $100 a week 
thereafter. (Our opening brief p. 41-47.) Huber quit and 
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iVent elsewhere on or before Sept. 1st, 1942, while Durildey. 
worked a couple of weeks longer, then he quit. Some part of 
the work on this job was completed on Sept. 3rd, 1942, but 
:n~t all of it. It was not fully completed by Newman qntil 
J.~n. 21, 1943 (our opening p. 46). It was done throughou~ 
by Newman from his own resources, and he alone had th~ 
cyontract with the Government and the responsibility, ~n~ 
he it was who gave the performance bond. 
~ · As to the railroad job, it was completed at some time 
prior to Sept. 3rd, but the evidence does not show just when: 
There was no evidence of joint venture on this job, but it 
was a loss, no profits, in any event. See our opening brief 
p. 47-48. 
As to the Harrison-Dorman job, it was never completed. 
For reasons explained in the .record work had to be suspended 
on it, and the parties never went back to it. There was a 
heavy loss and no profits on this job. See our opening brief 
p. 38-41. 
Nevertheless the trial court chose to conclue that these 
three jobs were all "joint ventures" as above quoted. And 
thereafter the three jobs were referred to by both court 
and plaintiffs' counsel as joint venturers in line with the 
dassification so given them. Defendant's counsel nowhere 
agreed to the correctness of the court's views or terminology, 
but they understood what the court meant after the court 
had so ruled. And they were not obliged to protest or object 
every time thereafter that the court or counsel chose to use 
the expression of "joint ventures." 
With this resume, we may better understand the court's 
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later remark or query quoted by counsel on page 14 of thei~ 
brief, viz: 
•, \.. 
"I think the record-perhaps Mr. Callister got 
this into the record, but to make sure, the court would 
like to say that it is admitted by all parties that M~. 
Newman and Mr. Dunkley at least were agreed that 
the joint venture would terminate on Sept. 3rd." 
'fo which Mr. Callister at once said: 
"I think that is right, your honor, and we will so.-
stipulate." 
As a matter of fact there had been no such agreement or 
admission ever made by Mr. Newman that any joint ,venture 
ever existed, on either one of these jobs, save possibly, in 
effect, with respect to the Harrison-Dorman job, by his testi-
mony abstracted on pages 38-41 of our opening brief. And 
all work on that job had been stopped and abandoned by 
both plaintiffs and defendant some time prior to Sept. 3rd. 
Work on the railroad job had been finished before Sept. 3rd, 
though plaintiffs were not partners or joint venturers on it 
(our opening p. 47-48). Of course, Mr. Callister was glad 
enough to get in on such a stipulation as the court· implied. 
Following Callister, the record recites that Mr. Morrissey 
said: "Yes." 
, The only justifiable implication from this assent, in 
view of the above state of the record, is that Mr. Morrissey 
was willing to agree that there were no joint venture opera-
tions, as the court had been using that term, thatcontinu~d 
on past the date mentioned by the court, or Sept. 3rd, 1942. 
J:Ie positively did not mean or intend to give away his client's 
I ' 
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rights, -nor to surrender the benefit of defendant's <>ft re. 
peated testimony and protestations that he never did enter 
into any joint venture agreement with Huber and Dunkley 
Qn this hospital job, nor for that matter, on the railroad job. 
And the Harrison-Dorman job was certainly abandoned be-
fore that date in an uncompleted condition, and the work was 
completed by the Curtis Gravel Go. at a loss. Certainly 
it could be conceded that all claims of the plaintiffs 
to participation in each of these jobs as joint ventures had 
been ended or terminated by or before Sept. 3rd, without 
admitting that they ever had any such status. Neither 
court nor counsel could have been deceived or misled by 
it in the above condition of the record. The hospital job 
is the only one of the three that made any money, and the 
plaintiffs were given definite notice that they were 'out 
of it on that job on the very day the contract was taken. 
Pages 14-15. There is no such uncontradicted testimony 
as claimed by counsel at bottom of his page 14 et seq. The 
uncontradicted testimony is exactly to the contrary. See 
testimony of both Dunkley and N ewrnan quoted to the record 
on pages 26-27 of our opening brief. 
Pages 15-16. The testimony ~ere is unfairly handled 
by counsel. In view of the undisputed evidence that New-
man gave plaintiffs notice on the very day he took the 
hospital contract that they were not to share profits but 
could remain and work for $100 a week wages (opening brief 
pp. 41-47), there is no basis for the contention that he was 
influenced to terminate it afterwards by his later discovery 
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that he was going to make money on that job. Newman 
always made money on his jobs except those on which 
Dunkley and Huber worked, such as the Harrison-Dorman 
job, railroad job, Geer job and Fort Douglas job. They copped 
all the money on the Geer job and Stearns-Rogers jobs and 
Newman got nothing; likewise on the Ft. Douglas job, 
though he furnished all the capital and equipment save two 
trucks. 
Pages 16-20. This discussion is covered by what we 
have said herelri in our discussion of the Rozelle and Gibbs 
cases, ante. 
As regards the so-called receiver's report, it was a void 
document on its face because, among many other reasons, 
code section 104-27-6 was disregarded in its preparation. It 
showed illegal procedure and illegal sources of information 
on its every page and by the testimony of its author. So it 
did not matter whether it was "in" or "out," filed or not. 
It was still void, and the Court was prohibited by statutes 
cited in our opening brief from either treating it as evidence 
or basing any judgment upon it. 
Page 22. They say with respect to Dansie's report that 
it did not attempt to resolve the issues of fact in favor of 
any party. We say in reply that is one of its vices which 
makes it of no value for any purpose. That is one of the 
statutory duties of a referee, his prime duty, to determine 
the issues of fact and make findings that will settle the 
issues, and do it upon sworn testimony at that. He must 
sit as a court, swear witnesses, hear competent testimony, 
exclude incompetent evidence, make findings of fact and 
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submit to the court a proposed decree as. well as fiqdiftgs"-
His: 'failure to do any of these things robs his report of ~ny 
vital'ity or legal standing. Nor CO"!Jld it, acquire these virtues 
by the mere filing of it, as counsel seems to suppose. Filed 
or not it was a mere dead and lifeless thing. It could not 
help or harm any one, filed or unfilE1d. 
Counsel's definition of the duties of. a referee does not 
agree with our code sections 104-27-6, 104-27-7, 104-54-5, 
104-39-8, and having been given as advice to the referee 
whose appointment he obtained, destroyed the value of his 
work. His conception is that a referee is a mere auditor, 
not that of a statutory referee. 
Page 23. The statement that Dunkley's testimony re-
garding yardage was sufficient and uncontradicted is with-
out record support. See our opening brief pp. 107-110. It 
does not support itself. 
Page 26. The brief says that when evidence before a 
referee is not reported the findings are yet final and cannot 
be disturbed on appeal. The answer to this is that the 
referee made no findings, heard no evidence from sworn 
witnesses, took no pains to follow the law, and presented no 
report that is even prima facie valid. It shows on its face 
his recourse to hearsay· and all sorts of illegal information. 
Page 27. They say that it is fundamental that if a 
party desires to challenge the report of a referee he should 
do so within proper time. That is true, but a party is not 
put upon his· challe·nge u:ritil there is a report of a referee 
presented. A mere nullity does not concern anyone. As 
Judge Straup says, "Its nullity will keep, and is not mellowed 
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by age.·,· This is not the case of a judicial record that is faJr 
and perfect upon its face, requiring allegation and proof tq 
overthrow it. It is completely null and void on its face, fro;qt 
beginning to end, denounced by statute, and insupportable 
from· any point of view. 
It is probably useless to go on through this 34 page 
brief of respondents counsel, at the risk of tiring the court. 
Its errors are glaring on almost every page. They say on 
page 15 that plaintiffs advanced some of their money to pay 
employees. If so, it was precious little, and they took out 
of the bank account and otherwise withheld from plaintiff 
far more money than they ever put in. Wherefore defen-
dant's insistance that they account to him fully and com-
pletely. They had no right to commingle their private funds 
with those of their employer, and it was an abuse of trust 
to do so. 
On pages 32-34, they seek to justify the exaction of a 
bond from defendant as a condition to partial relief from an 
unjust and unfounded judgment of over $19,000.00. Their 
void referee report allowed only about $12,642.97 (our ope~ 
ing p. 147) after crediting plaintiff with various illegal 
exactions which are unsupportable on this record. The bal-
ance in excess of $12,642.95, or $6,808.06 is represented by 
plaintiffs' share of $10,212.09 unpaid labor and expense bills 
which they themselves ought to pay, not Newman, on the 
theory that they were partners or joint venturers on the 
Harrison-Dorman job. What they asked, however, and what 
the court consented to give them, was that they have judg-
ment for the sum of $19,451.03 if plaintiffs would give him 
a bond for $7000.00 to refund the $6,808.06 of it, in ca~e 
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plaintiff should later be compelled to pay those 'bills of 
$10,212.09 on the Harrison-Dorman job. They never gave 
this refund bond of $7000.00 as ordered by the court. Not-
withtanding, however, the judgment was entered for the: 
full $19,451.03 (without a refund bond) and plaintiffs then 
p~oceeded promptly to get out an execution and to garnishee 
appellant's funds in his bank account. To release which 
appellant had to put up a stiff cash deposit as an appeal 
bond, to get his bank funds released from garnishment. See 
the files and records of this case sent up on appeal. 
We think the foregoing adequately shows of what fabric 
the respondents' case consists on this appeal. Much more 
could be said in detail, but we forbear. 
Respectfully submitted, 
0. H. MATTHEWS, 
P. G. ELLIS, 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
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